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This study examines the post-issue stock price performance of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) 
from advanced and emerging Asian markets from 1991 to 2004. We provide a comparative 
assessment on the short- and long-term stock performance of Asian IPOs with comprehensive 
international evidence. We use several different methods to examine the robustness of IPO 
performance. Our results reveal that whilst there is initial underpricing in Asian IPOs, the 
existence of long run underperformance for the Asian IPOs depends resoundingly on the 
methodology used for assessment.  
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The role and importance of initial public offerings (IPOs) in financial markets has changed over 
time and IPOs now represent a significant component of stock market activity. In Asian capital markets, 
initial public offerings (IPOs) perform one of the most crucial roles in the allocation of new capital. Over 
2001-2005, Asia had the largest number of IPOs (2956), a lot more than North America (825), Europe 
(1098) and Australia and New Zealand (504). In terms of total capital raised, Asian IPOs have increased 
almost 64% from $25 billion in Year 2001 to $41 billion in 20051. Economic growth in China is driving 
IPO activity throughout Asia. According to Ernst and Young’s (2006) survey, China (including Hong 
Kong) raised US$24.3 billion from their Initial Public Offering activity in 2005, and tops the ranks in 
Asian IPO markets and is second worldwide after the U.S. The momentum of Initial Public Offerings in 
Asia warrants a closer understanding of their performance. 
 
This pan-Asian study examines the post-issue stock price performance of Initial Public Offerings 
(IPOs) from 1991 to 2004 for China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Malaysia and Singapore. Whilst there are 
many country-specific studies in the existing IPO literature, there have been very few regional studies on 
IPO performance. Hence, we provide comparative cross-country analyses on aspects of initial 
underpricing and long term performance of Asian IPOs to shed light at a regional level. 
 
We find that initial underpricing in emerging Asian markets, China (202.63%), Korea (70.30%) 
and Malaysia (61.81%) exceed those in developed Asian markets, Hong Kong (21.43%), Japan (34.04%) 
and Singapore (33.10%). The varying degrees of underpricing observed in different countries suggest that 
there may be some unique market-specific features that influences IPO underpricing. In particular, listing 
standards are generally higher in more developed stock markets, resulting in the lower levels of 
underperformance observed. There are various explanations for underpricing, with theories based on 
asymmetric information, agency costs, and signalling but Ritter and Welch (2002) point out there is no 
single dominant theoretical cause for underpricing. Hence, there is no universal IPO underpricing theory 
or hypothesis applicable for all times and across countries.  
 
There are considerable variations in the measures of abnormal returns and the statistical tests used 
to detect long-run abnormal stock returns. In fact, Barber and Lyon (1997, 1999) have revealed that the 
method for calculating returns influences both the magnitude of the measured abnormal return as well as 
the size and power of the statistical tests. Following these studies, we have used 4 alternative methods to 
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examine the robustness of the long run performance of Asian IPOs: buy and hold return, controlling firm 
approach, reference portfolio, and the Fama and French (1993) model. The variety of methods used will 
enable a comprehensive view to be formed as to whether our findings are sensitive to the models 
employed. Our work is motivated by the ongoing discovery of biases in event studies involving long 
horizon returns. In our study, we are not directly interested in explaining long-run underperformance. 
Rather, we are interested in explaining underperformance as a mis-measurement. 
 
Our results show that the existence of long run underperformance for Asian IPOs depends on the 
methodology used. This finding supports Gompers and Lerner’s (2003) argument that the relative 
performance of an IPO sample depends on the method used to examine performance. Moreover, Ritter 
and Welch (2002) argue that the characteristics of an IPO sample, in terms of the time period and the 
selection criteria, also contribute to the observed differences in the findings of studies on the long run 
performance of IPOs.  
 
Our study makes the following contributions to the current literature on initial public offerings. 
First, we focus on a large sample of Asian IPOs starting from 1991 to 2004. Unlike most existing studies 
which are limited to studying an individual country, our broader sample includes six countries in Asia and 
provides a new regional perspective. Second, we provide comparative analyses on Asian IPOs’ stock 
performance on both aspects of initial underpricing and long term performance. These are important 
issues for portfolio managers, investors and policy makers alike.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of the Initial 
Public Offerings (IPOs) literature, whilst Section 3 and 4 describes the dataset and methodologies used 
respectively. Following this, Section 5 discusses the empirical results from different methods. In Section 6 
we analyse Asian IPO performance in an asset pricing framework before finally concluding in Section 7.  
 
2. Overview of the IPO Literature 
 
Empirical studies traditionally show that there are two main patterns associated with IPOs: short-
run underpricing and long-run underperformance. The first significant study that attempts to measure 
performance based on stock returns is Ritter (1991). In this study, issuing firms during 1975 to 1984 were 
matched by industry, size and indices. Returns were calculated using cumulative average adjusted return 
with monthly rebalancing, as well as buy-and-hold returns over three years. It was found that issuing 
firms substantially underperformed in the three years subsequent to going public. Ritter (1991) explains 
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this by investors being overoptimistic about the prospects of firms that are issuing equity for the first time, 
and firms taking advantage of these ‘window of opportunities’. IPO underperformance is not restricted to 
the United States. The study of Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) finds that the IPO underpricing 
phenomenon exists in all 25 countries investigated, with higher IPO underpricing in developing markets. 
Consequently, despite the fact that IPOs represent exploitable investment opportunities if the stocks are 
purchased at the price set in the initial offer, the empirical evidence seems to reveal that they should not 
be held in the long run.  
 
Short-run underpricing is a persistent feature of the IPO market. Most models of underpricing 
based on asymmetric information share the prediction that underpricing is positively related to the degree 
information asymmetry. However, Ritter and Welch (2002) point out that these models have been 
overemphasized; there is no single dominant theoretical explanation for underpricing. Thus, it is not so 
much a matter of which model is right, but a matter of the relative importance of different models. One 
explanation can have greater importance for some firms at particular times. 
 
In terms of long-term performance, studies on individual Asian market IPOs have mixed findings. 
Chun and Smith (2003) and Kim, Krinsky and Lee (1995) find that, in Korea, IPOs outperform the stock 
market average in the long run. This finding is consistent with the superior average ex post-financial 
performance of IPOs; and government intervention also helps to partially explain these results. Dawson 
(1987) reports negative long-run performance for IPOs in Hong Kong and Singapore but positive for 
Malaysia. More recently, Nurwati, Campbell and Goodacre (2007) also document significant 
overperformance in Malaysian IPOs. As we can see, some findings for long-term returns in the Asian 
region contradict the consensus in the IPO literature that there is pervasive significant long-term under 
performance.  
 
Indeed, the evidence on long run post-IPO performance is controversial, with researchers 
reporting contrasting results. Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995), report that U.S IPO 
companies do experience significantly negative returns in the first three to five years following an IPO. In 
a more recent study on the U.S. market, Gompers and Lerner (2003) investigate 3,661 IPOs from 1935 to 
1972 for holding periods up to five years after listing but their findings demonstrate that IPO performance 
depends on the method used to measure returns. Their results show some evidence of underperformance 
when value-weighted event-time buy and hold abnormal returns are used. However, the 
underperformance disappears when either equally weighted event-time buy-and hold or cumulative 
abnormal returns are employed. Moreover, the results they derived from the CAPM and Fama French 
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three factor regressions suggest that there is no abnormal performance. Espenlaub, Gregory and Tonks 
(2000) provide further evidence on the sensitivity of long-term performance to the choice of empirical 
methods. Using data on 588 IPO companies in the UK over the period 1985 to 1992, they compare 
abnormal performance based on five alternative benchmarks using both an event-time approach and a 
calendar-time approach and find significant differences. 
 
The degree of underperformance varies over time. Ritter and Welch (2002) showed that IPOs 
matched on size and Book-to-Market (BM) during 1990-1994, averaged 3-year BHARs of –12.7 percent, 
but IPOs over 1995-1998 had an average BHAR of 11.6 percent. Similary, the Fama-French intercept for 
the 1973-1989 period was an insignificant –0.15 but it was a significant -0.48 during 1990-2000. 
 
Brav and Gompers (1997) find the level of performance related to the characteristics of the 
investment using a sample of IPO firms from 1972 to 1992. They replicate the Loughran and Ritter (1995) 
approach whilst extending it along several dimensions. They find that when issuing firms are matched on 
size and Book-to-Market ratios, IPOs do not underperform. In fact, underperformance is a characteristic 
of small, low book-to-market firms regardless of whether they are IPO firms or not. The results are 
supported by those of Ritter and Welch (2002), who find that IPOs – when matched on size and Book-to-
Market ratios – have only very modest underperformance. Additionally, when studying IPOs issued from 
1973 and 2001, they indicate that the direction and magnitude of bias in long horizon studies can be 
sensitive to sample characteristics such as the Book-to-Market ratio, size, exchange listing, and the time 
period studied. They recognise that this is one of many difficulties faced by academics, and thus the 




In our paper we consider the initial public offerings of a sample of six Asian countries (China, 
Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Malaysia and Singapore) between January 1, 1991 and December 31, 2004. 
The offers included in our study have to meet the following three criteria: 1) Only common stock is 
involved in the offering and is being offered; 2) The stock is only traded in domestic currency; and 3) The 
stock is listed on the mainboard only (stocks traded in a secondary stock exchange is excluded from the 
analysis). 
 
The issue characterization consists of the offering price, issuing date, amount and place issued, 
and retained equity and is obtained from the Securities Data Company (SDC) database. We collected a 
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sample of IPOs from SDC’s new issues database over the sample period. Data on public offerings is 
matched with data on stock market performance collected from Thompson’s DataStream. This included 
stock prices, market capitalization, Price-to-Book and Book-to-Market ratios.2 After matching the two 




There exists a diverse range of IPO performance measures. Barber and Lyon (1997), Kothari and 
Warner (1997), Barber and Lyon (1999), Fama (1998) and Loughran and Ritter (2000) all argue that the 
method of performance measurement influences both the magnitude of the abnormal returns as well as the 
size and power of the statistical test. Brav, Gecy and Gompers (2000) state that Buy-and-Hold abnormal 
returns (BHARs) tend to over-estimate the long-run underperformance of IPOs and the use of benchmark 
market indices suffers from new listing bias, survivorship bias and rebalancing bias. 4 However, Barber 
and Lyon (1997) emphasize the advantage of BHARs for measuring the investor´s experience, as the use 
of mean monthly calendar-time returns (cumulative returns) does not adequately measure the returns 
obtained by an investor who holds a stock for a long period of time. The modelling problem becomes 
more severe as the measured horizon for IPO returns is extended because of the compounding effect. As 
such, we employ alternative methods of measurement in this study to ensure robustness and to assess the 
sensitivity of Asian IPO performance to the models used. 
 
Hence, in this paper, we calculate both short- and long-term abnormal equity returns based on (i) 
market indices, (ii) size and Book-to-Market ratio (BM) matched control firms and (iii) size and Book-to-
Market ratio (BM) matched reference portfolios. The first-day return of the IPO firms is defined as the 
percentage change of the first-day closing price of the IPO firms from the IPO offering prices. For short-
term stock price performance, we also calculate the 1-month, 3-month, 6-month and 1-year Buy-and-Hold 
Abnormal Returns (BHARs) based on the market indices and the control firm approach. For long-term 
performance, we calculate the 3-year and 5-year BHARs based on different benchmarks. 
                                                 
2 To match the two databases (Securities Data Company SDC and Thompson Financial Service DataStream) by 
firms CUSIP code, Stock code and Firm’s name. 
3 A total of 384 IPOs with erroneous first trading or issue dates, missing shares outstanding, missing first day closing 
price and an issue size exceeding shares outstanding were omitted in the data clean up. 
4 New listing bias, arises because some firms in the market indices (benchmark portfolio) have begun trading only 
recently and have abnormally low returns; Survivorship bias, arises because only companies which were successful 
enough to survive until the end of the period are included, and Rebalancing bias, arises from compounding returns 
on the market indices (benchmark portfolio) assuming periodic rebalancing, whereas sample firm returns are 




The control firm approach involves selecting firms that have similar risk characteristics and 
financial variables as the sample firms to control for common risk factors that are related to expected 
returns. As such, our matching is performed on the basis of size and Book-to-Market ratios. Loughran and 
Ritter (1995) examined the statistical and economic significance of Book-to-Market effects, and come to 
their conclusion on IPO long run underperformance without controlling for Book-to-Market effects. Both 
firm size and Book-to-Market ratio would play a big role in the decision of firms to go public. Value firms 
tend to have higher Book-to-Market ratios, while growth firms have lower Book-to-Market ratios, and 
this distinction is important. If not controlled for, we may erroneously compare the returns on an IPO with 
high growth potential but at an early stage of its life cycle (small firm with a low Book-to-Market) with a 
control firm that is a ‘long-term loser’ with no future growth prospects (small with a high Book-to-Market 
ratio). We first filter for size, and then select a non-issuer with the closest Book-to-Market ratio. Barber 
and Lyon (1997) find that a size filter of 70-130 percent yields well specified test statistics5. We employ a 
filter of 50-150% as this method involves a tradeoff between having a close match in size or proximity in 
Book-to-Market.  
 
For the reference portfolio approach, starting from 1st January 1991we use all stocks in each 
country to create size quintile breakpoints with an equal number of firms in each size quintile. Size is 
defined with market capitalization (i.e. number of outstanding shares X stock price at the end of the 
preceding month). Within each size quintile we form five Book-to-Market portfolios with an equal 
number of firms to form 25 (5 X 5) size and Book-to-Market portfolios. Equally-weighted returns are 
calculated for each portfolio for each month. Each IPO firm (issue) is matched to its corresponding 
benchmark portfolio. The matching is repeated monthly, creating a separate benchmark for each issue. We 
eliminate all IPO firms from the various portfolios for five years after their equity issue.  
 
Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) do not recommend BHARs because BHARs will 
overstate (understate) the real BHARs if any portion of the return horizon is positive (negative). However, 
in this paper, BHARs are used because: (i) Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) neglect compounding 
effects whereas BHARs include compounding effects and produce returns that reflect investor experience; 
and (ii) Barber and Lyon (1997) state that CARs are subject to a measurement bias, a new listing bias and 
a skewness bias. On the other hand, the BHAR which is calculated as the rate of return for the sample 
firm less the rate of return for a reference portfolio is subject to a new listing bias, a skewness bias and 
                                                 
5 Firms with negative Book-to-Market ratios and missing data are excluded from analysis. 
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rebalancing bias. On balance, Barber and Lyon (1997) recommend BHARs in long-run studies because 
the test statistic is well specified and corresponds to an implementable trading strategy that does not 
make unrealistic assumptions about transaction cost (cost of frequent rebalancing). The BHAR for 












itk CRIERBHAR     (1)   
 
where BHARkτ is the Buy-and-Hold abnormal returns for k sets of comparison; ERit is the Buy-and-Hold 
investment return for the event firm i at day (month) t whereas CRit is the Buy-and-Hold investment 
return for the control firm j at day (month) t. The return windows we use to capture long-run performance 
are 3 years and 5 years respectively. To furnish insight into the performance of new securities since their 
IPO date, a 1 year return window is also evaluated. We define a year as 12 x 21 trading day intervals, 
hence a 1-year window has 252 trading days, a 3-year window has 756 trading days and 5-year window 
has 1,260 trading days. 
 
For each event window, a conventional t-statistic based on the cross-sectional standard deviation of rated 
firms’ abnormal returns is calculated, which is then used to test the significance of the compounding 











=       (2) 
 
where BHARp is the sample average and σ(BHARp) is the cross-sectional sample standard deviation of 
the cumulative BHARs for n number of firms. 
 
5. Results and Analyses 
 
5.1 Comparing Initial Returns of Asian IPOs  
 
In Table 1, we present the number of IPOs and first-day initial returns of the IPO firms across six 
major markets in the Asia-Pacific region in the period between 1st January 1991 and 31st December 2004. 
All countries have positive and statistically significant initial returns. The main finding of Table 1 is that 
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whilst the degree of underpricing is variable across countries there exists prevalent underpricing of IPO 
issues in Asia. Hence, investors can earn abnormal returns by simply subscribing to the IPO firms and 
selling them at the end of the listing day.   
 
<Insert Table 1> 
 
Interestingly, initial underpricing in Asian emerging markets, China (202.63%), Korea (70.30%) 
and Malaysia (61.81%) exceed those in developed markets, Hong Kong (21.43%), Japan (34.04%) and 
Singapore (33.10%) where listing requirements are more stringent. Recent studies like Jelic, Saadouni and 
Briston (2001) document that high initial returns are a feature of immature IPO markets where the 
regulatory environment is weak and investment bankers have failed to adequately manage the process of 
listing new issues. 
 
Our results show that the level of excess returns from IPO underpricing in the Asian region has 
gradually increased over the 1990s. Until the 1997 financial crisis, Asian IPOs had been typified by 
abnormal excess returns to investors. But since the beginning of the 1997 crisis, the IPO market has 
declined significantly. During the “Technology Boom” period of 1999-2000, there was a resurrection of 
Asian IPOs accompanied by a greater degree of underpricing.  
 
IPO initial returns in other geographical regions have shown a similar pattern of underpricing 
over long periods of time. Underpricing in the U.S. averages between 10 and 20 percent but there is a 
substantial degree of variation over time. The average first-day return was 15% during 1990-1998, 65% 
during 1999-2000, and 12% during 2001-2004.6  During the “Hot Issue Period”, in 1999 and 2000, the 
average IPO was underpriced by 71% and 56%. Ljungqvist (2005) report average initial IPO underprcing 
for 19 European countries over the period 1990-2003, and 8 Latin American countries over the period 
1990- 2001. Among European markets, 18 out of the 19 markets had initial underpricing less than 40%; 
and in Latin American countries, 7 out of 8 markets had initial underpricing less than 10%.  Hence, our 
results on Asian IPOs show a substantially larger degree of average initial underpricing in comparision 
with U.S., the Europe, and Latin America. For Asian IPOs in our sample the average first-day return was 
73% during 1990-1998, 70% during 1999-2000, and 57% during 2001-2004. However, the more 
developed markets, Hong Kong (21.43%), Japan (34.04%) and Singapore (33.10%) experienced a similar 
level of underpricing compared with U.S. and European markets for example U.K (28%), Germany (35%) 
                                                 
6  Underpricing averages are based on the data available from Jay Ritter’s website 
(http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm). 
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and Switzerland (17%). Furthermore, the extent of IPO underpricing is much higher in Asia than in Latin 
America.  
 
We find that China has the highest level of initial returns in the Asian region in almost every year 
within the period studied. This may be explained by its distinctive corporate governance system, security 
laws and lack of legal enforcement. Our results indicate that the market adjusted first-day return is 202.63 
percent with a t-statistic of 10.504 in line with previous studies on Chinese IPOs (Su and Fleisher (1999), 
Chen, Firth and Kim (2004) and Chan, Wang and Wei (2004)) that also find that there is evidence of 
extreme initial underpricing.  Reasons identified by existing studies for the large degree of IPO 
underpricing in China include the pre-delisting uncertainty of the IPO firms, uncertainty and information 
asymmetry in the transition from a closed economy to an open economy, substantial state or quasi-state 
share ownership, lengthy time gap between the offering and listing dates and limited investment 
opportunities for investors. 
 
In contrast to China, Hong Kong has the lowest level of initial returns. Previous IPO studies on 
Hong Kong such as McGuinness (1992) find that there exists 17.6 percent initial underpricing of the IPO 
firms. When Cheng, Cheung and Po (2004) split their sample into pre-and post-1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis they find that investors could earn 20.3 percent before the crisis and only 6.5 percent after the crisis. 
Consistent with these studies, we find clear evidence of initial underpricing in Hong Kong IPO firms. The 
initial first-day return is 21.43 percent (t-statistic 2.844) which is statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. The low degree of underpricing in Hong Kong is in line with that documented in other developed 
markets within the region like Japan (Hamao, Packer and Ritter (2000)) and Singapore (Lee, Taylor and 
Walter (1996)). 
 
For all other developing markets in Asia, there is strong evidence of initial underpricing. In 
particular, during 2000 to 2002, Korea experienced the highest initial return within the region. This may 
be due to the effects of the ‘Internet Bubble’, followed by its advanced development and expansion of the 
technology industry. Consistent with Kim, Krinsky and Lee (1993) we find a significant 70.3% initial 
return for Korean IPOs for a more recent sample period. Lastly, our 1- day returns for Malaysian IPOs are 
similar to the findings made in Jelic, Saadouni and Briston (2001) on a yearly basis. Extreme initial 
underpricing of the Malaysian IPOs may be due to market inefficiencies and imperfections as well as 
government manipulation.7  
                                                 
7 The listing procedure is similar to that of Hong Kong and Singapore, however, government authorities constrained 
the offer price during the 1980s. 
 11 
5.2 Comparing Short and Long Term IPO performance based on alternative benchmarks 
 
Next, we analyse the stock performance of Asian IPOs based on alternative benchmarks: 1) Local 
market Index, 2) Size and Book-to-Market matched control firms and 3) Reference Portfolios. Inspection 
of Table 2 reveals results differ when different benchmarks are adopted. In fact, Lyon, Barber and Tsai 
(1999) claim that the analysis of long run abnormal returns is a treacherous game and this is precisely 
what we encounter in our study. Our results show the issue of benchmark misspecification is also a 
problem in Asian markets. 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
 
We present the post-listing Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) for the Chinese IPOs 
which issue A-shares in two stock exchanges (Shanghai Securities Exchange and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange) based on the market indices. The BHARs of the IPOs are compared with the Shanghai 
(Shenzhen) A share index. We find that the BHARs are consistently positive and statistically significant at 
the one percent level in all event windows of interest.  The 1-month, 3-month and 6-month BHARs are 
63.63 percent (t-statistic 5.326), 59.14 percent (t-statistic 5.664) and 51.07 percent (t-statistic 5.420) 
respectively. For the long horizon, the BHARs still remain significantly positive, performing better than 
the market indices for up to five years. Contrary to the results benchmarked against the market indices, 
there is no evidence of IPO outperformance when they are compared with the control firm. The first-, 
sixth- and twelth- month BHARs are positive but statistically insignificant. For the long-run horizon, the 
3-year and 5-year BHARs are –8.16 percent and –22.47 percent with t-statistics of –2.533 and –4.999 
respectively. Our results suggest that Chinese IPO firms underperform in the long-run based on the 
control firm approach. 
 
We compute the BHARs based on the reference portfolios, and all event windows of interest are 
negative. The 3-year BHARs are –22.6 percent with t-statistics of –9.730, these results are consistent with 
Chan, Wang and Wei (2004). Our results based on the reference portfolio approach suggest that there 
exists long-term underperformance of Chinese IPOs, which is consistent with the previous study.  
 
In terms of Hong Kong’s IPOs relative to the Hang Seng Index, the 1-month, 3-month, 6-month 
and 1-year BHARs are 13.52 percent, 12.85 percent, 15.92 percent and 14.75 percent with t-statistics of 
2.705, 3.139, 4.584, and 2.945 respectively. For the long-run horizon, the BHARs are negative and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The 3-year and 5-year BHARs are –26.66 percent and –
39.60 percent with t-statistics of –3.266 and –3.909 respectively. This clearly suggests that Hong Kong 
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IPO firms underperform in the long run. Our results based on control firms are consistent with Chan et al. 
(2007)’s findings of long-term underperformance of Hong Kong’s Growth Enterprise Market stocks 
relative to alternative control firms, based on the size and Book-to-Market ratio, size and industry, and 
Book-to-Market ratio and industry.  Our results suggest that based on matched control firm approach, the 
1-month, 3-month, 6-month and 1-year BHARs are all negative but statistically insignificant. In the long-
run event windows of interest, the 3-year and 5-year BHARs are -65.27 percent and -41.98 percent with t-
statistics of –4.221 and –2.34 respectively. For reference portfolio approach the results are similar with 
the main findings based on the control firm approach. The 1-year, 3-year and 5-year BHARs are -38.97 
percent, -27.9 percent and –44.55 percent with t-statistics of -3.666, -2.553 and -2.284 respectively. 
Therefore, the results based on the reference portfolio approach suggests that long-term 
underperformance of IPOs does exist in the Hong Kong market.  
 
Combined results indicate that there exists long-term underperformance of the Hong Kong IPO 
firms no matter which benchmarks are adopted for the long-run. However, conflicting results are obtained 
for the short-term performance of the Hong Kong IPO firms. Whilst positive and statistically significant 
BHARs are obtained based on the Hang Seng Index, negative but statistically insignificant BHARs are 
achieved based on control firm and reference portfolio approaches.  
 
We present the BHARs for the Japanese IPO firms based on the Nikkei Index. Our results suggest 
that there is no evidence of long-term underperformance of the Japanese IPO firms. The 1-month, 3-
month, 6-month and 1-year BHARs are 16.89 percent (t-statistic 1.981), 11.86 percent (t-statistic 2.552), 
10.49 percent (t-statistic 1.988) and 12.14 percent (t-statistic 2.020). In long-run horizons, the 3-year and 
5-year BHARs based on the market index are positive but with insignificant t-statistics. This implies that 
Japanese IPO firms do not underperform in the long run.  
 
Different results are obtained by using the control firm approach, as the 1-month and 3-month 
BHARs are negative with insignificant t-statistics. However, the 6-month, 1-year and 3-year BHARs are –
6.41 percent (t-statistic -2.624), -15.09 percent (t-statistic –1.966) and -14.12 percent (t-statistic -2.724). 
Our results based on control firm approach suggests that Japanese IPOs perform poorly in the long run. 
Similar to the control firm approach, the BHARs based on reference portfolios are negative and 
statistically significant in most event windows. In the long run, the 3-year and 5-year BHARs are -20.9 
percent and -36.4 percent with t-statistic of –4.228 and –5.007 respectively. Therefore, our results based 
on the reference portfolios suggest that there exists short-term and long-term underperformance of the 
Japanese IPOs. These results are consistent with Hamao, Packer and Ritter (2000), those findings implied 
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that the Japanese IPOs performed more poorly than a portfolio of matching firms in a three-year 
investment horizon space. Again, different conclusions are drawn based on the different benchmarks. 
Underperformance of the IPOs exists based on control firms and reference portfolios, while there is no 
such evidence for the market indices which are similar with Chinese findings. 
 
There is no evidence of long-term underperformance of Korean IPO firms based on the Korean 
stock market index. Chun and Smith (2003) investigate a sample of 325 Korean IPOs during their sample 
period from 1986 to 1995. The authors find that the 1-year, 3-year and 5-year BHARs based on the 
market index are 23.5 percent, 35.6 percent and 77.3 percent with t-statistics of 2.98, 2.67 and 3.93 
respectively. In our study, the 1-year, 3-year and 5-year BHARs are 40 percent (t-statistic 2.064), 36.31 
percent (t-statistic 1.671) and 43.02 percent (t-statistic 1.993) respectively. Our BHARs are different to 
the corresponding BHARs found in Chun and Smith (2003) due to different sample periods studied. 
However, we can confidently conclude that Korean IPOs outperform the stock market index over time. 
There is no evidence of long-term underperformance based on control firm approach either. For the long-
run horizon, the 3-year and 5-year BHARs are positive and statistically insignificant. Our BHARs based 
on the reference portfolio approach contrast with the results based on the market index and control firm 
approach. The BHAR is –14.6 percent after the first year, and drops to –57.6 percent after 3 years, and –
60.3 percent 60 months after listing. Our results imply that there is some evidence of long-term 
underperformance of Korean IPOs based on the reference portfolio approach. Again, we achieve different 
results based on different benchmarks.  
 
For Malaysia, results based on local market index in all event windows of interest are positive 
and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The 1-month, 3-month and 6-month BHARs are 37.05 
percent (t-statistic 5.957), 38.08 percent (t-statistic 5.518) and 30.64 percent (t-statistic 4.738). Jelic, 
Saadouni and Briston (2001) finds 1-year and 3-year market-adjusted BHARs of 12.82 percent and 21.98 
percent respectively in the study period from 1980-1995. Similarly, our results suggest that positive and 
statistically significant excess returns exist in the long run. The 1-year, 3-year and 5-year BHARs are 
34.16 percent, 25.93 percent and 27.55 percent with t-statistics of 3.347, 2.727 and 2.864 respectively.  
Positive long run returns feature in other earlier studies relating to Malaysian IPOs such as Dawson 
(1987).  
 
The short-term BHARs based on the control firm approach are weaker compared with BHARs 
based on the market index, but they are still positive and statistically significant. The 1-month, 3-month 
and 6-month BHARs are 14.17 percent, 12.90 percent and 21.24 percent with t-statistics of 4.170, 3.686 
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and 3.521 respectively. For the long-run horizon, the 1-year, 3-year and 5-year BHARs are positive but 
insignificant. Our results based on the reference portfolio approach suggest that underperformance exists 
for Malaysian IPOs in the medium- and long-run horizon. We find negative and statistically significant 
BHARs. The 1-year, 3-year and 5 year BHARs are –5.9 percent, –35.0 percent and -71.7 percent 
respectively. Our results based on the reference portfolio approach are in contrast the previous findings in 
Malaysian IPOs studies over the long-run horizon. In short, we observe an outperformance of Malaysian 
IPOs based on the market index and control firm approach, whereas there is an evidence of long-term 
underperformance based on the reference portfolio approach. Conflicting results may due to benchmark 
misspecification.  
 
For Singaporean results based on the market index, the 1-month, 3-month, 6-month and 1-year 
BHARs are 19.87 percent (t-statistic 3.484), 23.42 percent (t-statistic 3.752), 24.21 percent (t-statistic 
4.124) and 12.81 percent (t-statistic 3.123) respectively. For the long-run horizon, the 3-year BHAR is 
positive; the 5-year BHAR is negative but insignificant. Consistent with Ritter (1991) we document that 
long-term underperformance does not exist in Singaporean IPO firms. However, we cannot find any 
statistically significant BHARs based on control firm approach.. Based on the reference portfolio 
approach, in the long run, the 3-year and 5-year BHARs are –20.3 percent and –39.9 percent with t-
statistics of –2.092 and –2.186. Our results imply that Singaporean IPOs perform poorly in the long run 
based on the reference portfolio. Again, different conclusions are drawn on the basis of different 
benchmark specifications.  
 
In summary, based on the results across six major Asian financial centers, the market index 
approach suggests that short term outperformance occurs in all countries. Except for Hong Kong, we 
cannot observe negative and statistically significant BHARs in the long-run horizon based on the market 
index. The size- and Book-to-Market control firm approach indicates obvious long-term 
underperformance of the IPO firms in China, Hong Kong and Japan, while insignificant returns are found 
in the other three countries. Hence, we can infer that IPO firms perform poorly from the perspective of the 
reference portfolio approach. We find conflicting results are obtained when different benchmarks are 
adopted. 
 
6. Explaining IPO returns with the Fama-French Three-Factor Model 
 
We employ the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) in explaining the time-series 
variations of IPO returns over time. We assume an event period of five years. For each calendar month, 
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we calculate the return on a portfolio composed of IPO firms within the last five years of the calendar 
month. The calendar-time return on this portfolio is used to estimate the following regression: 
 
Rpt – Rft = α0 + α1 (Rmt – Rft) + α2 SMBt + α3 HMLt + εit,  (3) 
 
Where Rpt is the simple monthly return on the calendar-time portfolio, Rft is the monthly short-
term (three-month deposit) interest rate, Rmt is the return on an equal-weighted market index, SMBt is the 
difference in the returns of portfolios of small stocks and big stocks, HMLt is the difference in the returns 
of portfolios of high book-to-market stocks and low book-to-market stocks. The portfolios, which are 
constructed at the end of each June, are the intersections of two portfolios formed on size (Market 
Capitalization) and three portfolios formed on the ratio of Book-to-Market. The size breakpoint for year t 
is the median (Market Capitalization) market equity at the end of June of year t. Book-to-Market for June 
of year t is the book equity for the last fiscal year end in t-1 divided by size for December of t-1. The 
Book-to-Market breakpoints are the 30th and 70th (country) percentiles.  
 
<Insert Table 3 here> 
 
The results of each country obtained by using the Fama and French three-factor model (1993) 
confirms the non-existence of long-run abnormal returns (underperformance). The intercept takes 
negative but insignificant values. 
 
Nevertheless, only the market premium is significant. For countries like China, Malaysia, and 
Korea, they have a positive factor loading for SMB, indicating that the outperformance (relative to the 
market index) of IPO firms is due to the small firm effects. And for other countries, as neither the SMB 
nor HML have statistically significant coefficients. Fama-French regressions tend to have negative 
intercepts for portfolios of small growth (low Book-to-Market) stocks, whether or not IPOs are included 
in the portfolio (Brav and Gompers, 1997). The model is biased towards finding IPO underperformance 
since a large fraction of IPOs fall into this category. As Fama(1998) highlights, the number of firms in the 
IPO portfolio changes through time, creating residual heteroskedasticity that can affect inferences based 
on the intercept. 
 
In summary, when using Buy-and-Hold returns based on market Indices, there exists abnormal 
returns that are occasionally significant in certain periods. Nevertheless, when using the other two 
methodologies – calendar-time portfolios and the Fama and French three-factor model, which are based 
 16 
on the calculation of mean monthly calendar-time returns – the existence of long-run underperformance is 
supported. The magnitude of the long-run abnormal returns depends on the methodology and the 
benchmark used for the return adjustment on IPOs. 
 
Consequently, the existence or otherwise of long-run underperformance in IPOs is a question of 
methodology that depends on the form of estimating the long-run abnormal returns. In short, as argued by 
Fama (1998), all the methods used for the estimation of abnormal returns are subject to problems arising 
from the poor specification of the models and no method is able to minimise these problems for all classes 
of events. Even  models, such as the Fama French three-factor model and benchmark matched on size and 
Book-to-Market ratio, controlling for variations in the returns influenced by these two variables, give rise 
to different estimations of the abnormal returns (Fama, 1998)8.  
 
7. Conclusion  
 
This study provides comparative pan-Asian analyses on the stock performance of Asian IPOs 
based on alternative methodologies. The results of the long-run performance of the IPOs made between 
1991 and 2004, in different event windows, reveal, that conflicting results are obtained when different 
benchmarks are adopted. One of the possible explanations for this phenomenon is that our results may be 
subject to benchmark mis-specification, which is normally found in a long-run event study. The 
magnitude of abnormal returns depends on the methodology used and on the benchmark used for the 
return adjustment on IPOs. The existence or otherwise of long-run underperformance in IPOs is a 
methodological issue that depends on the approach used in estimating the long-run abnormal returns. 
Thus, long-run abnormal returns are present when BHARs are used, but not when using other 
methodologies, like monthly calendar-time returns and the control firm approach. Thus, we contribute 
new evidence on Asian IPOs in this study to support the inconsistencies in measures of IPO performance 
in financial research. The measure of IPO performance remains an unsatisfactory issue and warrants 






                                                 
8 It should be noted that Fama and French (1993) document that the three-factor model has systematic problems in 
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Initial Returns of IPOs among Asian countries 
Table 1 shows the number of and first-day raw returns (in percentages) of the IPO firms across the six financial markets in the Asian Region over the period from 
1st Jan 1991 to 31st Dec 2004. The first-day initial raw return is defined as the difference between the IPO’s first-day closing price and the offer price divided by 
the offer price. T-statistics are shown in brackets. ** and * denotes significance at the 1 and 5% levels respectively. 




























































































































































































































Table 2  
Short and Long Term Stock Performance of Initial Public Offerings based on Different 
Benchmarks 
 
This table presents the short and long term BHARs (in percentages) of Initial Public Offerings in six Asian countries 
from 1991 to 2004 based on different benchmarks - Market Index, Control Firm Approach and Reference Portfolio. 
T-statistics are shown in brackets Significance at the 1% and 5% levels are denoted with ** and * respectively. 
  1-month 3-month 6-month 1-year 3-year 5-year 
        
China Market Index 63.63** 59.14** 51.07** 42.64** 32.56** 28.01* 
  (5.326) (5.664) (5.420) (5.335) (3.688) (2.370) 
 Contolling firm 0.54 1.60 2.69 -3.06 -8.16* -22.47** 
  (0.739) (1.322) (1.942) (-1.682) (-2.533) (-4.999) 
 Reference Portfolio -0.50 -0.60 -3.20* -7.00** -22.60** -31.80** 
  (-1.439) (-0.955) (-2.482) (-4.037) (-9.730) (-9.090) 
        
HK Market Index 13.52** 12.85** 15.92** 14.75** -26.66** -39.60** 
  (2.705) (3.139) (4.584) (2.945) (-3.266) (-3.909) 
 Contolling firm -2.84 -4.76 -17.46 -20.41 -65.27** -41.98* 
  (-1.463) (-0.816) (-1.736) (-1.235) (-4.221) (-2.340) 
 Reference Portfolio 5.22 -2.25 -9.00 -38.97** -27.90* -44.55* 
  (1.267) (-0.189) (-0.610) (-3.666) (-2.553) (-2.284) 
        
Japan Market Index 16.89* 11.86* 10.49* 12.14* 4.84 2.78 
  (1.981) (2.552) (1.988) (2.020) (1.144) (1.136) 
 Contolling firm -1.55 -2.12 -6.41** -15.09* -14.12** -7.02 
  (-1.214) (-1.245) (-2.624) (-1.966) (-2.724) (-1.179) 
 Reference Portfolio -2.80** -5.50** -7.00** -4.40 -20.90** -36.40** 
  (-3.138) (-4.472) (-3.397) (-0.938) (-4.228) (-5.007) 
        
Korea Market Index 34.30** 34.03** 38.63* 40.00* 36.31* 43.02* 
  (3.344) (2.950) (2.265) (2.064) (1.671) (1.993) 
 Contolling firm 4.10 4.36 -4.17 2.64 3.20 1.49 
  (0.777) (0.800) (-0.442) (0.310) (0.188) (0.138) 
 Reference Portfolio 1.50 2.30 -2.70 -14.60 -57.60 -60.30** 
  (0.419) (0.437) (-0.394) (-1.446) (-1.429) (-3.066) 
        
Malaysia Market Index 37.05** 38.08** 30.64** 34.16** 25.93** 27.55** 
  (5.957) (5.518) (4.738) (3.347) (2.727) (2.864) 
 Contolling firm 14.17** 12.90** 21.24** 8.74 5.14 11.32 
  (4.170) (3.686) (3.521) (1.660) (0.539) (0.575) 
 Reference Portfolio -0.40 1.70 -2.50 -5.90 -35.00** -71.70 
  (-0.234) (0.565) (-0.628) (-1.099) (-3.463) (-1.290) 
        
Singapore Market Index 19.87** 23.42** 24.21** 12.81** 4.18 -3.52 
  (3.484) (3.752) (4.124) (3.123) (1.739) (-1.161) 
 Contolling firm -4.18 -0.70 0.52 0.22 -7.91 -6.21 
  (-1.339) (-0.223) (0.124) (0.033) (-0.931) (-0.586) 
 Reference Portfolio -0.30 -0.10 2.20 -1.30 -20.30* -39.90* 




Time-series regressions of monthly IPO portfolio returns on the Fama and French three-factors 
 
This table reports the results of the time-series regressions of monthly IPO portfolio returns with the Fama and 
French three-factor model. Rmt is the return on the equal-weighted index of the market in month t.  Rft is the three-
month deposit interest rate which is a proxy for the risk-free rate.  SMBt is the return on small firms minus the return 
on big firms in month t; and HMLt is the return on the high book-to-market stock portfolio minus the return on the 
low Book-to-Market stock portfolio in month t. T-statistics are shown in brackets Significance at the 1% and 5% 
levels are denoted with ** and * respectively. 
 
Rpt – Rft = α0 + α1[Rmt – Rft ] + α2SMBt + α3HMLt + εt (3) 
 
 
 α0 α1 α2 α3 R2 
China -0.002 0.972** 0.313** 0.032 0.973 
(-1.64) (30.98) (4.49) (0.28)  
HK -0.004 0.797** 0.149 0.120 0.858 
(-1.01) (8.77) (1.12) (0.27)  
Japan  -0.005 0.776** -0.273* -0.229 0.769 
(-1.77) (10.45) (-1.99) (-0.796)  
Korea -0.008 0.645** 0.349** 0.231 0.836 
(1.23) (9.75) (3.34) (1.21)  
Malaysia -0.004 0.810** 0.515** -0.117 0.879 
(-0.79) (11.76) (6.79) (-1.66)  
Singapore -0.002 0.824** 0.012 0.034 0.785 
(-1.74) (9.54) (1.03) (0.97)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
